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NOTE
Constitutional Law: Hutchins v. District of Columbia:
The Constitutional Dilemma over Juvenile Curfews
L Introduction
When judges are required, in interpreting and applying legislation, to balance the
interests of a political community with the constitutional rights of individuals, they
find themselves in a precarious situation. On the one hand, they risk trespassing on
the domain of the policy makers and overturning the legitimate will of the duly
elected democratic majority. On the other hand, courts risk trespassing on the rights
of the individual person. Although an unenviable task, judges usually succeed at
balancing the competing interests when they uphold a guiding principle to be
impartial; regard only the law inasmuch as it is divorced from outside concerns; and
seek as much ideal justice as is possible in a pragmatic world.
The existence of unenumerated rights forms a proverbial "no man's land" between
political will and civil liberties. Yet, constitutional jurisprudence insists that
fundamental rights are present in the very spirit of the U.S. Constitution -
unwritten, but every bit as vital as those expressly set forth in the Bill of Rights.'
These include rights that perhaps the founders saw no need to list, believing them
too evident to require formal protection. Or, perhaps the founders left these rights
unwritten intentionally out of a belief that the matters of which they were part
belonged more properly in the realm of politics. The necessity of recognizing these
rights creates a dilemma that courts frequently face.
Among these unenumerated rights is a "right to movement." Although many
courts have recognized the right to movement as fundamental, the U.S. Supreme
Court has addressed the issue in only limited contexts.' The term "movement"
means a multitude of things, including international, interstate, and intrastate travel;
movement in the sense of mere locomotion; and freedom from state-created
hindrances such as residency requirements, vagrancy ordinances, and police
interrogation? The few contexts in which the Court has addressed this right have
never included municipal curfew ordinances,4 and only rarely has any law restricted
an otherwise law-abiding citizen's movement outright The Court has ruled in other
1. See infra text accompanying notes 115-22.
2. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (declaring the right to interstate travel
to be fundamental); Kent v. Dalles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (holding that the right to travel is a part of the
constitutional liberty interest).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 132-57.
4. See Scott A. Kizer, Note, Juvenile Curfew Laws: Is There a Standard?, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 749,
753 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 143 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("That citizens can walk the
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contexts that children are citizens enjoying the same fundamental rights as adults6
and that a broad right to movement indeed exists.7 While it may seem counterin-
tuitive to suggest that minors have a fundamental right to be on the streets at night,
there are legitimate circumstances implicated by juvenile curfews, not all of which
are practical, and not all of which can be anticipated by statutory defenses. And,
while a juvenile curfew ordinance may be valid on its face, the enforcement and
application of the ordinance may extend beyond that which is permitted by
constitutional standards.
This note analyzes the recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit in Hutchins v. District of Columbia,' which overturned the district court's
injunction against the enforcement of Washington D.C.'s juvenile curfew law. This
note compares the circuit court's reasoning with other court decisions regarding
similar issues. Although Hutchins raised many constitutional issues, this note
focuses on the freedom of movement issue and addresses the appropriate
constitutional test for dealing with the rights of minors. Part II of this note briefly
traces the history of curfews in America, and describes recent circuit court decisions
regarding juvenile curfews. Part E[ examines the plurality and dissenting opinions
of Hutchins. Part IV analyzes the Hutchins plurality opinion regarding a minor's
right to movement in light of the reasoning of other federal appellate and district
court opinions, arguing that the plurality erred in implying that a broader right to
movement does not exist. Part IV also analyzes federal case law with regard to
constitutional tests and the rights of minors. It argues that the Hutchins plurality
correctly chose the "intermediate scrutiny" test but that the curfew ordinance was
not substantially tailored to the District of Columbia's objective.
11. Juvenile Curfews v. Fundamental Rights in America
The word "curfew" comes to the English language from the Norman French
couvre feu, or "cover the lamp," which is a phrase meaning colloquially "lights
out."' Within the United States, curfews have met legal challenges almost since
streets, without explanations or formal papers, is surely among the cherished liberties that distinguish this
nation from so many others."); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.
1971) ("It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept
of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.").
6. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors,
as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate").
7. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
8. 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
9. See Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate for Ocean City, 204 A.2d 688, 690 (Md. 1964) (colloquial
translation by the author). The first curfews in England may have been enacted under William the
Conqueror in the eleventh century, although there may have been a curfew in Oxford as early as the




their inception." In Ex parte McCarver, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
overturned a curfew ordinance that prohibited anyone under the age of twenty-one
from being on the streets after the bell at the town's Baptist Church had rung."
The court ruled that the ordinance was an unreasonable invasion of the rights of
citizens to come and go as they please. 2 Thus began a century-long relationship
between juvenile curfew ordinances and the American courts. Despite the longevity
of this relationship, only in the last forty years have curfews enjoyed widespread
popularity.' 3 And, only the 1990s have witnessed a veritable "boom" in juvenile
curfew enactments. 4 The reasons for this boom are obvious to most Americans.
Juvenile crime rates from the end of the 1980s into the beginning of the 1990s
soared.'5 The belief that removing juveniles from the streets at night would reverse
this alarming trend motivated many large cities to enact juvenile curfew ordinan-
ces. 6 Smaller cities, even those without serious crime problems, saw merit in this
movement and quickly followed, suit. 7  The result today - most U.S.
municipalities with substantial populations have some form of curfew ordinance."
Local governments in Oklahoma, not immune to such concerns, have enacted their
own juvenile curfews in the state's largest municipalities. 9
Not all juvenile curfew ordinances are created equal. Depending upon the level
of restriction and the statutory defenses available, a court will be more or less
inclined to find a constitutional violation." An important U.S. Supreme Court
10. See, e.g., Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936 (Tex. Crim. 1898).
11. See id. at 937.
12. The court declared in its ruling that the law is
paternalistic and is an invasion of the personal liberty of the citizen .... No power exists
at common law for the enactment of such an ordinance by a city government. It is
arbitrary and does not apply to all persons alike. It makes criminal acts which in
themselves are not criminal ....
Id. at 937.
13. See Brian Privor, Dusk 'til Dawn: Children's Rights and the Effectiveness of Juvenile Curfew
Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 419 (1999).
14. See id. at 419 n.19 (stating that "the 1990's will be remembered as a decade in which a 'curfew
movement' swept across America") (quoting William J. Ruefle & Kenneth M. Reynolds, Keep Them at
Home: Juvenile Curfew Ordinances in 200 American Cities, 15 AM. J. OF POLICE 63,75-77 & tbls.1-2
(1996)).
15. See id at 421 n.25 (stating that "the rate at which juveniles committed violent crimes increased
nearly 43% from 1989 to 1993") (quoting from OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE
16 (1997)).
16. See Kizer, supra note 4, at 749-50.
17. See Privor, supra note 13, at 420.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA., CODE art. XV, § 30-423; TULsA, OKLA., CODE tit 27, §
2800-06. These Oklahoma curfew laws are substantively identical to the Dallas, Charlottesville, and
District of Columbia ordinances, which are discussed herein. See infra text accompanying notes 29-33,
41-45.
20. Compare Bykofsky v. Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (finding that a curfew,
where reasonable in its breadth, does not violate any fundamental rights or equal protection) with Waters
v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989) (declaring a curfew invalid for overbreadth).
200
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
decision outlining a methodology for determining the constitutional validity of a law
restricting the rights of juveniles generally is Bellotti v. Baird.' In Bellotti, the
Court struck down a law restricting a minor's right to an abortion, stating, "a child,
merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the
Constitution."' Quoting from the 1967 decision, In re Gault, the Court continued,
"whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone."' These statements solidified the Court's
previous pronouncements in the cases of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.' The Bellotti Court, meanwhile,
went on to declare three general factors differentiating the rights of minors from
those of adults, including "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the
parental role in child rearing."' The resulting policy resembled a balancing test
with constitutional parity between adults and juveniles except in narrowly justified
circumstances."
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the constitutionality of juvenile
curfew laws.' However, in the past decade, four U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
have issued important and far-reaching opinions on the matter. In 1993, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned a district court ruling that held the
curfew ordinance of Dallas, Texas, unconstitutional in Qutb v. Strauss." The
district court had ruled that the ordinance violated a minor's First Amendment right
to associate by creating unconstitutional classifications in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Fifth Circuit, noting the
rule in Bellotti,3' agreed that the Dallas curfew implicated the fundamental rights
of minors and thus was subject to strict scrutiny review." However, in a rare event
in constitutional jurisprudence, the court held that the curfew satisfied both the
compelling interest and narrow tailoring requirements of strict scrutiny analysis."
21. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
22. Id. at 633.
23. Id. (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)).
24. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
25. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
26. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
27. See Susan M. Horowitz, A Search for Constitutional Standards: The Judicial Review of Juvenile
Curfew Ordinances, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRos. 381, 409 (1991) (arguing that the Bellotti standard
should operate as a balancing tool to permit the review of juvenile laws as impinging on fundamental
rights without discounting the right all together).
28. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (denying a writ of certiorari in an
appeal of a decision upholding a juvenile curfew law); see also Kizer, supra note 4, at 753.
29. 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993).
30. Seeid at491.
31. See id. at492 n.6. The court here suggests that the Bellotti rule does not affect the determination
of whether juveniles possess fundamental rights or whether the constitutional test is different for
juveniles. See id. Rather, the court indicates that, under Bellotti, laws affecting the fundamental rights
of juveniles satisfy more easily the means/ends analysis, no matter the particular test. See id.
32. See id at 492.




In 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down a curfew
ordinance in Nunez v. City of San Diego.' In this case, a federal district court
upheld San Diego's curfew ordinance, claiming that the burden imposed on the
rights of minors was minimal and that the law was narrowly tailored to address a
compelling interest.35 The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court, ruling on the
grounds that the curfew law was void for vagueness, that it was not narrowly
tailored to meet the City's objective," that it was not a reasonable restriction on
time, place, or manner of speech,' and that it violated the fundamental rights of
parents to raise their children 9
In 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate
scrutiny to the curfew law of Charlottesville, Virginia, and upheld it as
constitutional in Schliefer v. City of Charlottesville.4 The curfew law of Charlot-
tesville closely resembled the curfew law of Dallas' The reasoning of the
Schliefer court was much the same as the Qutb court, with the exception of the
constitutional test employed.!2
Finally, in 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed a divided panel of its own court, as well as the district court, and upheld
the constitutionality of the District of Columbia's juvenile curfew law in Hutchins,
the case that is the subject of this note.!3
III. Hutchins v. District of Columbia
A. Facts and Procedural History
In September 1995, the District of Columbia formally adopted a juvenile curfew
ordinance that prohibited minors from remaining "in any public place or on the
premises of any establishment within the District of Columbia during curfew
hours."' The law defined a minor as "any person under the age of 17 years," with
the exception of a married or emancipated minor, and it set forth curfew hours as
running from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. beginning on any Sunday through Thursday
until the next day and from midnight to 6:00 a.m. beginning on any Saturday or
1981) (same circuit declaring a curfew law in Opelousas, Louisiana, unconstitutional).
34. 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997). The curfew ordinance in question had been enacted in 1947. See
id at 938.
35. See generally Nunez v. City of San Diego, 963 F. Supp. 912 (S.D. Cal. 1996), rev'd, 114 F.3d
935 (9th Cir. 1997). The district court relied on Qutb in applying a strict scrutiny analysis through the
Bellotti lens. See id. at 923; see also Qutb, II F.3d at 492.
36. See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 943. The court was particularly concerned with the vagueness of the
language, "loiter, wander, idle, stroll or play." Id. at 940.
37. See id at 949.
38. See Id. at 951.
39. See id at 952.
40. 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
41. Compare CHARLOTEsVILLE, VA., CODE § 17-7 with DALtAS, TEx., CODE § 31-33.
42. See Schliefer, 159 F.3d at 852.
43. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
44. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2183(a)(1) (1996).
2000]
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Sunday!' Although the District's evidentiary support was sketchy, the "findings
and purpose" of the law claimed that the District's Council had noticed an increase
in juvenile violence and gang activity and that minors under the age of seventeen
were "particularly susceptible" to the lure of crime and to being the victims of
crime.' The law further stated that the Council was seeking to reduce the
victimization of juveniles, reduce juvenile crime, and aid parents in carrying out
their parental responsibilities. 7 The law, besides setting forth a broad restriction
on minors' movement, created a number of defenses and exemptions designed to
protect innocent or justified activities.4 Some of these defenses included accom-
paniment by a parent, interstate travel, errand running at the behest of a parent,
involvement in an emergency, and the exercise of "First Amendment rights...
including free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly.""'
The law punished parents and employers for knowingly permitting or negligently
allowing a minor to violate the curfew.' The penalties included police detainment
of the minor, a $500 fine, community service, and parenting classes for the minor's
parents and guardians 5'
Tiana Hutchins, her parents, a private business, and others sued the District of
Columbia seeking to challenge the constitutionality of the curfew law and to enjoin
the law's enforcement.' These plaintiffs charged that the law violated four
constitutional principles, including equal protection of the law and the fundamental due
process right to free movement, the fundamental right of parents to raise their
children free from state interference, unconstitutional vagueness, and the minors' rights
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures&' In October 1996, Judge
Sullivan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled for the plaintiffs,
granting summary judgment on the basis of the equal protection and due process
claims, as well as the unconstitutional vagueness claim." The district court held that
the law violated the fundamental rights of movement and parental freedom and that
the law was not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest under the correlative strict
scrutiny analysis.' The District of Columbia appealed. A divided panel of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling in May 1998Vl The circuit court,
45. Id. § 6-2182(1), (5).
46. Id. § 6-2181(a), (b).
47. See id § 6-2181(e).
48. See id. § 6-2183(b).
49. Id § 6-2183(b)(1)(H). But cf City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (holding that
an anti-loitering ordinance designed to deter gangs was unconstitutionally vague and violated due process
by deterring innocent and constitutionally protected behavior).
50. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2183 (a)(2), (3) (1996).
51. See id. § 6-2183(c)(3), (d)(1), (2).
52. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1996), afJd, 144 F.3d
798 (D.C. Cir. 1998), vacated and rev'd en banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
53. Although not a state, the District of Columbia is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment through
the doctrine of "reverse" incorporation. See generally Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
54. See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 667.
55. See id. at 680.
56. See id.




vacating the panel's ruling, agreed to rehear arguments en banc 8
B. Issues and Holding of the Hutchins Plurality
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc,
reheard the arguments originally made by the plaintiff-appellees in the district court
and subsequently found, in a plurality opinion, for the defendant-appellants on each
issue. First, on the issue of the fundamental right to movement, the plurality ruled
that such a substantive right does not exist beyond the narrow right to interstate
travel. The U.S. Supreme Court had suggested a more general right only in dicta.
And, even if the right to movement did indeed exist, juveniles did not possess it.?
Second, on the issue of the fundamental right of a parent to raise a child, the
plurality held that the curfew did not implicate such a right because whether a child
is allowed outside the home at night is not an "intimate family decisionu."6' The
court then entertained the hypothesis that if the fundamental rights of children and
parents were implicated, where children's issues are concerned, intermediate scrutiny
would apply.' Consequently, according to the plurality the curfew could withstand
such heightened scrutiny because it is substantially related to an important
government interest.' As to whether the curfew law was unconstitutionally vague,
the plurality found that the District could legitimately enforce and expect broad
understanding of the language set forth in the curfew." Finally, the plurality
dispatched the claims that the curfew violated First and Fourth Amendment rights.
Regarding the First Amendment, the plurality held that a challenge must first prove
a facial violation of the First Amendment and that the statutory language at issue
only implicated a potential violation.' Regarding the Fourth Amendment, the
plurality held that giving a police officer discretion to make an arrest based on
reasonableness does not violate due process because probable cause is the very
definition of Fourth Amendment due process.'
C. Reasoning of the Hutchins Plurality
In addressing the fundamental right to movement and parental freedom claims,
the Hutchins plurality began by distinguishing between procedural and substantive
due process.' In describing the substantive right to movement, the plurality cited
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions creating the fundamental right to interstate travel
188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
58. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
59. See id. at 536-38 (referring to Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958); and
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 273 (1900)).
60. See id. at 538-39.
61. See id. at 541.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 541-46.
64. See id. at546.
65. See id. at 548.
66. See i.
67. See id. at 536.
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and then denied that those decisions lend any support to a broader right to
movement.'
The plurality next acknowledged a small number of cases supporting a broader
right to movement, but held that since those cases assert the right only in dicta, they
were not controlling.' The plurality also suggested that because a broad right to
movement must necessarily include international travel, and the regulation of
international travel has been specifically declared constitutional, a fundamental right
could not exist at all." The plurality declined to accept the right to movement
essays found in the "vagrancy cases""' as dispositive since the holdings of those
cases went to different issues. The court conceded that there was substantial case
law supporting a right to "intrastate" travel paralleling the right to travel interstate
and that this might implicate a fundamental right in instances where a curfew is
"draconian."' Finally, the plurality relied on a distinction between the rights of
juveniles and those of adults
In addressing the fundamental right of parents to raise their children without
government interference, the court was brief in its reasoning. The plurality outlined
the cases establishing the right and then discussed a distinction between a "private
realm of family life" and laws regarding public places.!' The plurality also looked
to the defenses to the curfew and found that parents still retain "almost total
discretion" over their children's activities. The plurality concluded its reasoning
on this issue by stating that curfews do not infringe any recognized "intimate family
decisions. "76
The remainder of the plurality opinion divided the other claims into two
categories. First, denying that the curfew implicated any fundamental right, the
plurality considered the problem of deciding which constitutional test to use, as a
hypothetical question.' Agreeing with case law on point, the plurality stated that
juveniles do possess constitutional rights, but found that those rights are not
coextensive with the rights of adults. The plurality resolved the dilemma of
which constitutional analysis to use by compromising the usual strict scrutiny test
68. See id. (citing Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79-81
(1982); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758
(1966); and Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941)).
69. See id. at 537.
70. See id.
71. See id. (referring to Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) and Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) as the vagrancy cases).
72. Id. at 538.
73. See id. at 539-41.
74. Id. at 540-41 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)).
75. Id at 545.
76. Id. at 541.
77. See id
78. See id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), to support juvenile
rights, but then contrasting this with Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944) and Bellotti v.




and concluding that "something less than strict scrutiny - intermediate scrutiny -
would be appropriate."' Intermediate scrutiny requires that a law be substantially
related to the achievement of an important government interest." The plurality
reasoned that reducing juvenile crime and protecting minors from being victimized
by crime were important objectives.8 '
Next, admitting that determining whether the curfew is substantially related to
these objectives "is the more difficult question here,"' the plurality set forth a
three-part analysis for identifying a substantial relationship. The plurality looked to:
(1) "the factual premises upon which the legislature based its decision," (2) "the
logical connection the remedy has to those premises," and (3) "the scope of the
remedy employed."' Discussing the use of statistical and other sociological data
by both the Council in enacting the law and the district court in striking it down,
the plurality found that despite irregularities in the District's statistics, the
government need only demonstrate a substantial relation between the law and the
statistics?' The plaintiff-appellees' argument that the curfew should be confined to
the high-crime areas of the district in order to substantially tailor the law to its
objective was discarded as potentially racist or politically unpopular." The plurality
also noted that the defenses to the curfew helped narrow the scope of the law to
more suspicious "nocturnal activities. " '
D. Judge Rogers' Dissent
Hutchins had two dissenting opinions that differed mainly in the determination
of which constitutional test to apply when dealing with the fundamental rights of
minors." The more cogent dissent by Circuit Judge Rogers had four parts. Parts
I and II dealt with defining a fundamental right in general and defining the right to
movement in particular. In addressing the plurality's methodology for defining
fundamental rights, the dissent began by criticizing the narrow definition of the
rights at issue.' Instead of defining a right "as the mirror-image of a particular
burden," Judge Rogers admonished the plurality for not defining rights in a more
abstract context. 9 Otherwise, according to Rogers' dissent, narrow definitions
would result in stripping protection from constitutionally protected, disfavored
conduct and tipping the scales against recognizing any right.' Second, and
conversely, Judge Rogers argued that a narrowly defined right denies the recognition
79. Id.
80. See ki; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
81. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 542.
82. Id.
83. I.
84. See ii. at 543.
85. See id at 544.
86. See id. at 545.
87. See id. at 552, 570.
88. See id. at 552-54.
89. Id at 554-55.
90. See id. at 555.
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of an individual's interest against the "conventional wisdom."'" Third, Judge Rogers
asserted that although defining rights too broadly encourages improper subjectivity,
defining rights too narrowly results in the same problem in reverse. That is to
say, a court might be too subjective in its attempt to restrict a proposed right. Judge
Rogers claimed that since the plurality failed to proffer a methodology for defining
rights, it left open the door to apply whatever standard the court might subjectively
desire in the futureY" Fourth, Judge Rogers criticized the application of an equal
protection analysis to a fundamental rights issue. He asserted that the combining of
the analyses resulted in a "blurring" of the tests so that it allowed the plurality to
dispense with the equal protection claim, and, by extension, allowed the plurality
to deny the recognition of the fundamental right.' Finally, Judge Rogers attacked
the plurality's application of Justice Sca'ia's reductionist method for characterizing
a fundamental right, pointing out that the approach has never garnered a majority
on the Supreme Court.O
Judge Rogers' dissent continued by declaring that "there is no doubt that minors
possess rights that are fundamental."" He reasoned that the corpus of juvenile and
fundamental rights cases read together results, not in an absolution of such rights
when applied to minors, but only in a dilution.' In defining the right to movement,
his dissent distinguished the plurality's legitimate concern over extending a broad
right to locomotion, which might serve to challenge even "trivial ... impediments"
such as traffic lights, from a vital liberty interest protecting a citizen from "police
interference for mere [public] presence.""
Parts III and IV of Judge Rogers' dissent dealt with the means/ends analysis
appropriate for juvenile rights issues. He began by agreeing with the plurality's
application of intermediate scrutiny in dealing with the fundamental rights of
minors." While admitting that some juvenile curfews might survive intermediate
scrutiny and stating without comment that the "curfew has legitimate ends," Judge
Rogers claimed that the District's curfew was not substantially tailored to meet those
ends."° First, he criticized the District's evidence as being "too broad" in that it
included crimes and victimization by and of those who were not affected by the
curfew.'0' Second, Judge Rogers found the evidence too narrow in that it failed
to point out when juvenile crime and victimization occur.'" He next demonstrated
that over "90% of all juveniles do not commit any crimes," thus burdening a far
91. Id
92. See id
93. See id at 556.
94. Id
95. See id! at 557.
96. Id at 558.
97. See id at 558-59
98. Id. at 562.
99. See id at 563.
100. Id. at 564.





larger class than might be necessary." Judge Rogers distinguished the facts in the
Schliefer case as having "sturdier evidence."" Finally, Judge Rogers claimed that
"efficacy can be no substitute for constitutional scrutiny.""e In other words, the
curfew was not rendered constitutionally proper simply because the juvenile crime
rate had declined; a curfew of adults or a juvenile curfew covering day and night
would also reduce crime, yet they would both raise constitutional questions."
IV. An Analysis of Hutchins
A. The Freedom of Movement as a Liberty Interest
Liberty is an ancient word. Its most basic and common meaning is "freedom.""IU
It comes to the English language from the French liberti, and to the French from
the Latin libertas." Although its denotation in all three languages is the same, in
American jurisprudence it has connotations all its own." Liberty's mention in the
Fourteenth Amendment is loaded with legalistic meaning; along with "life" and
"property" it provides the foundation for the concept of substantive due process."'
Liberty's etymology has arguably". given the Supreme Court the jurisprudential
mandate to recognize the existence of broad, fundamental rights. These rights, in
turn, have spawned the recognition of other rights within what has been termed the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights."' When one of these rights is fully recognized
and its sanctity threatened, the menacing state action will be subjected to the
strictest of constitutional tests and will almost certainly fail."' The constitutional
103. Id. at 566.
104. Id. at 568.
105. d at 570.
106. See id
107. See BLACK'S LAW DICnIoNARY 664 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "freedom" as "[t]he state of being
free; liberty; self-determination; absence of restraint; the opposite of slavery.").
108. See THE OXFORD-HACHrIE FRENCH DICTiONARY 470 (Marie-Hl~ne Corrdard & Valerie
Grundy eds., 2d ed. 1997); THE PocKEr OxFoRD LAIN DICtrONARY 251 (James Morwood ed., 1995).
109. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 918-19 (6th ed. 1990). There are no fewer than thirteen
sub-definitions for "liberty" listed, including "personal liberty," which states, "The right or power of
locomotion; of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may
direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law." Id.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to thejurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Id.
Ill. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMivnNG OF AMERIcA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw
110-26 (1990).
112. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
113. "Strict scrutiny" requires that a state action be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). But cf Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 362 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that strict scrutiny does not
mean simply "strict in theory, but fatal in fact.").
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tests of strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review collectively
form the modern paradigm for constitutional review."4 And, as entrenched as
these tests are in constitutional methodology, it seems impossible to imagine that
anything will replace them in the foreseeable future.
One of the fundamental rights that courts often recognize as being under the
rubric of substantive due process is the fundamental right to movement.", This
makes sense because a literal, layman's reading of the words, "deprive any person
of... liberty""6 tends to indicate a person in a state of imprisonment, or in some
other analogous state of confinement. What is meant by "liberty" in this context
would at least mean the inverse of confinement, which "deprivation" of liberty
denotes."7 Syllogistically, therefore, liberty means freedom from confinement, the
synonym of free movement On its face such a conclusion is clearer than this
analysis would suggest. However, the clarity of this logical analysis becomes
muddied when one confronts the problem of defining due process.
Before undertaking a critical analysis of Hutchins, it is important to have a basic
framework for understanding the dual nature of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. A denotation/connotation dichotomy proves useful in
acquiring this cursory understanding because the courts have chosen to interpret due
process along similar lines. A denotative reading of the Due Process Clause
provides the basis for the concept of "procedural" due process. It means simply that
a state actor must be fair and impartial in its application of the laws; it must follow
established legal process owed to every person."' In this way, the literal reading
of the words "deprive any person of . . . liberty""' 9 does not create any
unenumerated rights. However, the connotative reading of the word "liberty" in the
Due Process Clause does lay a foundation for the recognition of many rights by way
of the doctrines of incorporation and "substantive" due process." Substantive due
process rights are based on the connotations (i.e., the implicit and traditional
meanings) of the term "liberty." Inherent in the American cultural understanding of
the word "liberty" is the "absence of confinement" connotation described above, or
114. The three most common tests include: the "rational basis test" (a law must be rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest), see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); the
"intermediate scrutiny" test (a law must be substantially tailored to meet an important governmental
interest), see, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); and the "strict scrutiny"
test (a law must be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest), see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
115. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (finding the right to travel to be
implicit in the concept of personal liberty); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648
(2d Cir. 1971) (stating that the right to interstate travel has a corollary in intrastate travel).
116. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
117. See, e.g., BLAcK's LAW DicrioNARY 298 (6th ed. 1990). Cf. supra note 107.
118. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970) (defining the fundamental
constitutional parameters for procedural due process).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (establishing the doctrine of
fundamental versus nonfundamental rights and the incorporation of fundamental rights in the Bill of




its analog "free movement '.'2' This particular connotation coincides with liberty's
denotation, resulting in the possibility of confusion. However, the word does not
uniquely mean one or the other, but both. The American concept of unenumerated
rights being founded on the connotations of liberty,'" this analysis suggests that
foremost among any fundamental rights derived from the Fourteenth Amendment
is a general right to movement.
B. The Fundamental Right to Movement in the Courts
The Hutchins plurality erred when it implied that a fundamental right to
movement does not exist." The Supreme Court has indeed found a fundamental
right to movement implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment.'1 The fact that the
Court has not heard a case implicating this right with regard to juvenile curfews
does not mean that the general right does not continue to hold an important position
in everyday American life. On the contrary, were it not for the fundamental right
of movement, states could restrict even the most innocent aspects of daily travel;
police could question a citizen's mere presence in public. Yet, few would doubt that
such restrictions would be constitutionally prohibited. The right to movement is
perhaps such an obvious aspect of personal liberty that the right has not been
specifically recognized as needing formal protection. What rational political entity
would ever legislate such a right away? Absent a compelling justification, such as
a civil emergency, it is unlikely a law would ever be enacted that would similarly
restrict the movement of adults who could, and surely would, vote the legislators
out of office. Thus, the judiciary is unlikely to deal with such an issue given the
systemic prohibitions present in a representative democracy with universal suffrage.
Suffrage, however, is not truly universal. Besides mental incapacity and conviction
of a felony, there is yet another prohibition to voting - age." Minors, by
definition, cannot vote. They are politically powerless in the truest sense of the
phrase. Therefore, the judiciary must be extra sensitive to the fundamental rights
of minors. In their capacity as the last defense of civil liberties, the courts should
weigh carefully the public policy at stake and realize, from both an ethical and
positivist standpoint,'" that a repudiation of a right so intrinsic to the concept of
a free society could substantially harm that society as a whole. This is especially
true when the particular court happens to bear the moniker of "the second highest
121. In saying "American cultural understanding," the author is intending a purely legalistic
reference, insofar as our legal tradition comes from the common law of England. See BLACK's LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 109.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
123. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 536-38 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
124. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age.").
126. From the standpoint of both Kantian and utilitarian ethics it is morally wrong to pursue a
policy that needlessly sacrifices the rights of autonomous, morally significant agents. For a brief and
accessible explanation of the ethical implications involved, see generally JEaRIE G. MURPHY & JULES
L. COLEMAN, PHIOsOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 67-106 (1990).
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court in the land.""
The foundation for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause is the prejudicial
treatment by a state actor of a suspect class.'" Prejudicial treatment can come in
the form of a facially prejudicial law or the prejudicial application of an otherwise
neutral law. A suspect class is any group of persons sharing an immutable trait
whose special protection has been recognized by law. While curfew laws are
facially prejudicial to minors, age is not a legally recognized classification for equal
protection purposes.' However, based upon the analysis proffered by Judge
Rogers,' an equal protection analysis is unnecessary. Rather, substantive due
process may stand on its own where a fundamental right is at stake. The issue first
demands a definition of the fundamental right. The analysis of a fundamental rights'
branch of equal protection and that of a substantive due process claim is essentially
the same.'3' Therefore, the underlying question remains, is movement a fundamen-
tal right?
The Supreme Court has defined "interstate" movement as a fundamental right.
In Shapiro v. Thompson" the Court invalidated Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and
District of Columbia laws that created a one-year residency requirement for
recipients of welfare benefits.'33 The Court held that such statutory provisions
violate a fundamental "freedom of travel" by discouraging poorer families from
moving wherever they so choose within the country." This seminal case
engendered a series of subsequent federal court rulings that struck down temporal
residency requirements for state benefits, all in the name of the fundamental
freedom of interstate travel.'35
Years earlier, in 1941, the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Edwards
v. California." When California enacted the "anti-okie" law, prohibiting the
transportation of indigents and migrant workers into California, the Court struck it
down as "void on its face and operatfing] to deprive the appellant of liberty without
due process of law and to deny him the equal protection of the laws.' 37
127. See, e.g., Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial Discretion: Standing at the Forefront of
Judicial Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 1548, 1550 (1993).
128. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that classifications based
on race implicate the Equal Protection Clause).
129. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (holding that age
does not constitute a discrete and insular group for equal protection purposes).
130. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 552-70 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
131. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (utilizing the same strict scrutiny analysis
triggered by the fundamental rights branch of equal protection as would be necessary under a substantive
due process analysis).
132. Id.
133. See id at 638-42.
134. Id. at 638.
135. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d
Cir. 1990).
136. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).




More recently, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa,'" the Court again dealt with
a residency requirement for state benefits in a slightly more subtle context. When
Arizona refused to provide county-funded, non-emergency medical care to a person
prior to that person's establishment of a one-year residency, the Court refined the
Shapiro ruling to strike down the residency requirement. 39 Because medical care
was a necessity of life, the Court reasoned that to withhold it constituted an
unconstitutional penalty on interstate travel." a In each of these cases and their
progeny, the Court interpreted the right to travel interstate as both a fundamental
right, deserving of strict scrutiny analysis, and a liberty interest, thereby applicable
to all "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, the Court has indicated a corollary between the fundamental right
to interstate travel and the right to move about within a state. In Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville,4' the Court struck down a municipal vagrancy ordinance as
unconstitutionally vague.' Justice Douglas's reasoning clearly supported a general
right to movement as implicit in the concept of personal liberty. However, the
holding of the case did not recognize this right directly or as distinct from the
vagueness theory. Instead, the holding struck down the vagrancy ordinance as
"void for vagueness, both in the sense that it 'fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden .. .' and because
it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests .... ." Without confronting curfews
by name, Justice Douglas did condemn their purpose by stating:
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled
by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The qualification "without any
lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for innocent acts . . . The
difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of
life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the
Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have
been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of indepen-
dence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity . . . . They have
encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating
silence.'45
Although the Court has struck down broad restrictions to movement among and
within the states, the Court has not upheld such restrictions anywhere. The paucity
of Supreme Court precedent dealing with overt restrictions to movement is rather
likely due to the uncommon existence of such restrictions.
138. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
139. See id. at 269.
140. See id
141. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
142. See id at 170-71.
143. See id. at 162.
144. Id
145. Id at 164.
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Recent examples of U.S. Circuit Court rulings on the right to movement tend to
blur the distinction between interstate and intrastate travel. In Lutz v. City of
York," the Third Circuit concluded that an unenumerated right to intrastate travel
exists under substantive due process, even while holding that the particular "anti-
cruising" law at issue did not violate it."v The Lutz court applied intermediate
scrutiny to this right, drawing an analogy to the time, place, and manner doctrine
of free speech jurisprudence." The reasoning of the Lutz court was admittedly
"ad hoc"'"9 and encompassed numerous constitutional arguments. However, the
court claimed that given the "rational continuum""' of substantive due process and
the precedent of Shapiro and its progeny, the court had no choice but to recognize
the basic right to travel as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply
rooted in the Nation's history." 5'
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed similar liberty issues in City of Chicago
v. Morales."5 In Morales, the Court struck down an anti-loitering ordinance
enacted to deter gang activity as unconstitutionally vague." Justice Stevens'
opinion held that because the ordinance did not set forth a requirement that the
prohibited conduct have a "harmful purpdse,'5 and because it prevented two or
more persons from congregating where even one of them was a gang member (thus
encompassing non-gang members) the ordinance was too broad.'55 Although the
Morales majority did not invoke the fundamental right to movement per se, the
same elements of unconstitutionality present in Chicago's failed ordinance existed
in the District of Columbia's curfew. That is to say, the District's curfew did not
require a harmful purpose on the part of juveniles and the ordinance applied to
innocent juveniles as well as criminals; juveniles reasonably safe from crime as well
as likely victims." In finding such breadth unconstitutional, the Morales Court
implicated the substantial tailoring requirement of the intermediate scrutiny analysis
present in the Hutchins opinion and strongly suggested that the District's ordinance
would not withstand this requirement."
146. 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
147. Id at 270.
148. See id at 269.
149. See id. at 268.
150. Id
151. Id.
152. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
153. See id at 63-64.
154. Id at 62-63.
155. See id
156. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2182 (5) (1996) with § 6-2183(a)(1) (stating that a minor is any
unemancipated person under the age of 17 and that a minor commits an offense simply by remaining in
a public place after curfew hours).
157. Based on the Morales reasoning, the District's curfew ordinance is too vague and unrelated to
its purpose to pass constitutional muster in that it criminalizes the innocent. Taken another way, this




C. Applying the Appropriate Constitutional Test
The Hutchins plurality was correct in applying the standard of "intermediate
scrutiny" to the fundamental rights of minors. Minors have the same fundamental
rights as adults." The difference is that minors do not have these rights to the
same extent as adults. What this difference translates into when making a
constitutional analysis determines the level of review. For example, the Tinker case
held that minors have the same extent of protection under the First Amendment
right to free speech as do adults, subject to time, place, and manner restrictions."
Hence, minors, like adults, could expect a strict scrutiny analysis from a court
hearing their claim of a free speech violation. However, the Bellotti case held that
minors are subject to certain factors that serve to lessen the extent of constitutional
protection for fundamental rights such as the right to have an abortion." ° The
distinction seems to lie in whether the fundamental right is enumerated or not.
Where the right is enumerated, as in the right to free speech, minors have full
constitutional protection commensurate with adults. Where the right is
unenumerated, as in the privacy right to an abortion, special considerations seem to
limit the extent of the constitutional protection of juveniles.
The factors articulated by the Supreme Court in Bellotti do not provide any
blueprints for defining the extent of juvenile rights; neither do they provide much
in the way of determining what level of review is appropriate for juveniles. Instead,
the Bellotti factors simply provide justifications for why some juvenile rights should
not extend to the level enjoyed by adults. Taking this way, courts are left with two
options. On the one hand, a court may follow the example of the Qutb court and
lower the government's threshold requirement for proving the relation of the means
to the end.16' In other words, a court may make it easier to prove "narrowly" or
"compelling" under strict scrutiny analysis. Or, on the other hand, a court may
follow the example found in Schliefer and Hutchins and simply take the level of
heightened scrutiny down a notch, from strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny,
when dealing with the fundamental rights of minors.62 The latter surpasses the
former in judicial efficacy for two reasons. First, it takes an entire step out of the
analytical process. Instead of starting with strict scrutiny and then struggling with
how to adapt the terms "compelling" and "narrowly tailored" to the Bellotti criteria,
a court would simply apply intermediate scrutiny and keep the specifics of the
Bellotti test out of the analysis completely. Second, a simpler analytical process
leaves less room for subjectivity. The interpretations of the words "narrowly" and
"compelling" are already sufficiently imprecise to allow for a high level of judicial
158. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-12 (1969).
159. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06.
160. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
161. See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492-94 (5th Cir. 1993).
162. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531,535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Schliefferv. City
of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998).
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discretion. With the Bellotti factors available to modify these words, the potential
for subjective interference from a judge's personal prejudices increases greatly.
The Hutchins plurality erred when it ruled that the District of Columbia's curfew
ordinance was substantially tailored to meet its important objective. It would be
wholly fruitless to argue that the District's objective of reducing juvenile crime and
the likelihood of juvenile victimization was not at least important. Certainly it was
important, and probably compelling as well. Few statements of purpose would
invoke a greater sense of urgency than one such as, "we must save our children
from becoming criminals and the victims of crime." However, a constitutional rights
analysis under intermediate scrutiny also requires that the State's means be
substantially tailored to its important objective."' The meaning of the word
"substantially" is somewhat subjective, although a court must be as objective as
possible. Yet, the word "substantial" does indicate a high standard. In high-crime
areas of certain cities, a curfew ordinance such as the District of Columbia's would
indeed be substantially related to the goal of preventing crime by and against
minors. On its face, therefore, the District's curfew ordinance is constitutional.
However, such an ordinance is unconstitutional where a less than substantial
relationship exists between the curfew's application and the goal of preventing
juvenile crime. An unconstitutional application would be the enforcement of a
juvenile curfew in a city or distinguishable area of a city that does not have a
juvenile crime or victimization problem. In Hutchins, the District failed to limit
application of the curfew ordinance to the areas of the District with recognizable
crime problems.' Therefore, the curfew ordinance in Hutchins was not substan-
tially tailored to meet its important objective and the District's curfew ordinance
should have failed the constitutional test.
The District of Columbia's curfew ordinance falls short of a substantial
relationship by way of its overbreadth. Because the District is large and contains
whole, definable suburbs and neighborhoods in which criminal activity by and
against juveniles is not a problem, the ordinance as applied to these areas is
unconstitutional. Conversely, there are certain areas of the District in which the
curfew ordinance would be constitutional, in that therein exists a crime problem or
potential for juvenile victimization. The Hutchins plurality countered this conclusion
by claiming that to require limited application of the curfew ordinance to high
juvenile crime areas of the District would be to invite accusations of judicial
racism." This claim, besides being presumptuous and dubious, is itself racist by
implication. The Hutchins plurality betrayed two stereotypical assumptions: (1) the
District's high-crime areas are home to members of a particular "race"; and (2)
members of this race compose the majority of the District's juvenile criminals. Even
if these assumptions are verifiable, the Hutchins plurality did not rely on any
evidence." In any case, no court may shirk its duty to uphold the law on the
163. See, e.g., Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541.






basis of some speculative fear of political unpopularity. To do so recalls the
disastrous undertones of Scott v. Sandford'67 and stands to lessen the public's
expectation of impartiality from the courts.
V. Conclusion
Even if constitutional on its face, a juvenile curfew ordinance may still violate
substantive due process where its application and enforcement does not comport
with the limits demanded by accepted constitutional methodology. In Hutchins, the
Council of the District of Columbia extended enforcement of a curfew ordinance to
include areas of the District where crime by and against juveniles was too minimal
to justify so drastic a restriction of the liberty interests of minors. In upholding the
constitutionality of the curfew, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
correctly applied the intermediate scrutiny test for dealing with the fundamental
rights of minors. However, the court erred by stating that to require stricter tailoring
of the law would invite accusations of racism against the court. Such reasoning is
unsupportable given the judicial duty to interpret the law impartially and according
to the objective criteria set forth in controlling case precedent and established
constitutional doctrine. The Hutchins court also erred in implying that a fundamen-
tal right to movement does not exist. This implication directly contradicts holdings
and dicta from U.S. Supreme Court cases in which a general right to movement
finds broad support.
The courts must always be careful in balancing the legitimate powers of state and
federal actors against the restrictions imposed on state action by the substantive
rights of individuals. Fundamentally stated, constitutional rights establish procedural
and substantive limits to the exercise of political authority. When a court expands
substantive rights out of some personal sense of justice or any subjective notion of
natural law, this can result in an abrogation of legislative and political privilege.
This is judicial activism. However, a court's restriction of rights for any of the same
illegitimate reasons, through "reverse" judicial activism, is at least as egregious a
violation of the judicial duty, but arguably more so given the essential nature of
fundamental rights and their paramount importance in the American constitutional
scheme.
William L Foreman
167. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) ("The Dred Scott Case") (holding that persons of African
descent could not sue in federal court because, at the time, they were not considered citizens of the
United States).
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